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Resumen. Este artículo analiza cómo los principios cooperativos, particularmente la gestión 
democrática, afecta al objetivo económico de la cooperativa. El modelo teórico muestra qué 
características debe presentar la función de producción de la empresa para que la democracia genere 
ingresos netos positivos. Los costes derivados de aplicar el criterio de una persona, un voto, ante la 
entrada de nuevos socios, son explícitamente incorporados en esta función de producción. Los 
resultados muestran que la democracia contribuye al éxito económico cuando la estrategia de toma de 
decisiones aplicada por los socios respeta el conjunto de principios cooperativos, especialmente cuando 
se adopta habitualmente una política de excedente positivo. Este estudio puede extenderse a todas las 
empresas de Economía Social interesadas en reforzar las instituciones democráticas en la gestión 
empresarial. 
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[en] Democratic firms and economic success. The co-op model 
Abstract. This paper analyzes how co-operative principles, particularly democratic management, affect 
the co-op’s economic objective. The theoretical model specifies the characteristics presented by the 
production function so democracy generates positive net income. Costs derived from maintaining the 
one person one vote criterion are explicitly incorporated into this function upon new membership. The 
results show that democracy contributes to the economic success when the decision-making strategy 
followed by the partners considers all cooperative principles, especially when a retained earnings policy 
is regularly applied. This study can be extended to all of Social Economy firms concerned about 
reinforcing democratic institutions through the business sector. This study can be extended to all of 
Social Economy firms concerned about reinforcing democratic institutions through the business sector. 
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1. Introduction 
The principle of democratic management is characteristic of co-operatives. Each co-
op member has a vote on the decision-making, regardless of their capital 
contribution. It is reasonable to expect these costs to be negligible when few 
members manage the firm and to increase as the number of partners increases 
(Hansmann, 1988; Hart and Moore, 1998). Adhering to democratic rules may 
represent less income for the members and reduce the co-op’s chances of economic 
success (Hansmann 1988, Morales 1996, Bel 1997, Hart and Moore 1998, Mozas 
2002). However, evidence reveals the economic success of large competitive co-
operatives within an international context (Birchall, 2014). Following the theoretical 
developments of Ward (1958), Domar (1956) and Vanek (1970) (WDV model, 
hereafter), abundant empirical works have rigorously contrasted the viability of co-
operatives as compared to conventional capitalist firms (Bonin, Jones and Putterman, 
1993). However, these studies make no focus on the extent to which the success of 
co-operatives relates to democratic management as well as to the rest of the rules 
governing cooperatives for over 150 years.  
One reason is that the literature is fundamentally based on the WDV model, 
which assumes that the aim of the co-operatives is simply a sum of individual 
objectives. This implies a sole procedure for applying the principles. However, co-
ops can apply the principles flexibly and define their collective objective while also 
achieving individual goals throughout the whole process. The way the co-operative 
distributes its net income makes it particularly evident. The full distribution of net 
income among partners, without retaining a part to self-finance the company, is 
compatible with the principles. However, this is also the case of a system choosing 
to retain income, which becomes a collective resource. One way or the other, the 
partners make decisions democratically. 
Considering the aforementioned, this paper proposes a model that analyzes co-
ops applying the principles flexibly while combining individual and collective 
objectives. It begins with the income function of the WDV model to collect the 
effects on net income, particularly the costs associated with democratic decision-
making, assuming that these costs increase as the number of partners increases. The 
analysis includes the different net income distribution options, especially when the 
co-operative is likely to reach an economic surplus. This is how the study confronts 
the similarities and differences between partner and co-operative perspectives. 
The results of the work show that partners can apply the same principles 
following different strategies to achieve their objectives. In all strategies, the 
cooperative provides positive net income to the partners. Yet this is no guarantee of 
co-op success, which requires a system of income distribution that meets individual 
and collective objectives. When the partners apply the democratic rule by admitting 
new members and democratically deciding to maintain a system of income 
distribution seeking to achieve both of these objectives, the cooperative consolidates 
and extends its model. This is crucial to the success of the co-op. Democracy 
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contributes to the economic success of the company when the decision-making 
strategy followed by the partners contemplates the set of cooperative principles. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the economic literature on 
the purpose of a co-operative. Section 3 describes the characteristics of the net 
income function to be presented by the firm once the decision costs are explained 
separately. It then illustrates a specific form of production that exemplifies the trade-
offs that partners confront when they follow co-operative principles to reconcile 
collective and individual objectives. Finally, Section 4 ends with a summary of the 
main results and conclusions. 
2. Theoretical debate 
The promoters of the co-operative movement had clear aims from the very start 
concerning the goals of a co-operative. In reaction to the enormous inequalities 
caused by the industrial revolution, their ultimate desire was to achieve a fairer 
society. The first co-operatives promoted by William King adopted different ideas 
promoted by the utopian socialists (Saint-Simon, Owen, Fourier, King, Buchez, 
Blanc, and Derrion) that were effectively collected in the statutes of The Wholesale 
in 1844, the consumption co-operative of the Rochdale Pioneers. These ideas later 
became, with certain variants, the principles of the co-operative movement through 
its main institution, The International Co-operative Alliance (Lambert, 1975; 
Lasserre, 1972; Estrin and Perotin, 1987). 
Ward (1958), Domar (1966) and Vanek (1970) followed these principles and 
modeled the co-op objective to compare it to conventional capitalist enterprises. 
Their criterion of maximization of net income per partner promoted a series of works 
that enriched the economic analysis of co-operatives. Notable among them is the 
work of Meade (1972) developing the WDV model to show it is possible to 
differentiate co-operatives under the same principles following very different 
strategies. It also considers co-operatives that may, in practice, behave like 
conventional capitalist firms. 
One of the fundamental criticisms of the model WDV model comes from the 
Theory of the Agency. Furubotn (1976), Jensen and Meckling (1979), among others, 
pointed out the problem of time horizon as one of the coops’ main weaknesses. The 
improbable recovery of part of the resources allocated to the company's retained 
earnings causes the member to constantly lose part of the future returns on capital. 
This loss puts co-operatives at a disadvantage with respect to conventional capitalist 
firms and entails disappearance, degeneration or a minority presence.  
Despite these criticisms, empirical evidence does not confirm the superiority of 
traditional capitalist enterprises (Bonin, Jones and Putterman, 1993). Co-operatives 
can compete with productivities or returns akin to those of the market. The 
phenomenon of underinvestment contradicts certain evidence. On the one hand, the 
average size of a co-operative is often greater than that of traditional companies 
(Perotin, 2015). On the other hand, some coops retain earnings from partners to 
reinvest in the firm (Cabaleiro-Casal and Iglesias-Malvido, 2016) and they use these 
retained earnings to face downturns (Navarra, 2016). This proves that partners also 
consider other objectives besides net income. Notable to this respect are the works 
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of Craig and Pencavel (1993), Burdin and Dean (2009) and Pencavel (2015), which 
introduce employment in the production function to contrast the weight partners 
grant to maintaining employment as opposed to partner income. This result coincides 
with empirical studies showing that cooperatives have a greater capacity to create 
employment under depressed economic conditions. However, co-operatives are the 
alternative in more scenarios than just economic crises. Other factors such as local 
banking development (Gagliardi, 2009), advisory services specialized in co-ops 
(Kalmi, 2013), human capital specificity and worker homogeneity (Belloc, 2017) 
may all trigger the formation of co-operatives.  
Two recent surveys about co-operatives agree on the need to readdress and delve 
further into the theoretical field. Dow (2018) points out the relative lack of 
theoretical research as compared to empirical work over the last decades. Bretos and 
Marcuello (2017) recommend studying how cooperative principles influence 
efficiency and competitiveness within the context of a more globalized world. Even 
though Dow (2018) suggests abandoning the WDV model, the impact of the 
principles on the net income of co-ops makes this model suitable to analyze co-ops. 
The reformulation must incorporate three fundamental principles: open membership, 
economic participation and democratic control. 
The principle of open membership proposes that the co-operative should 
welcome all those who wish to become members, provided they meet the necessary 
requirements, as a basic strategy for the expansion of the co-operative model. 
Therefore, according to this principle, the long-term goal of all co-operative firms 
should be to increase membership. The decision to admit new members must respect 
the principle of democratic management, which indicates that all decisions must be 
made following the one member one vote criteria. In this way, all those who 
contribute more capital to the company do not accumulate more power. 
In deciding whether to admit new members, partners consider the impact of their 
decision on their income, conditioned by the application of the principle of economic 
participation. Unlike the two former principles, this principle is less explicit in its 
content due to the classical debates concerning fair price and the role of profit in 
capitalist firms (Lasserre, 1980). The so-called value of commutative justice assumes 
that capital must be remunerated at a limited interest rate, work must be remunerated 
according to a fair wage and the price paid to the inputs delivered by the producers 
must also be fair. In this way, the price of the products will be fair for the final 
consumer if the income of the activity covers the intermediate costs and the fair 
remuneration of the factors. Upon achieving these objectives, the co-operative also 
achieves the individual objectives of its members and contributes to the welfare of 
society as a whole.  
Discrepancies are greater concerning the so-called value of distributive justice, 
which affects the amount of surplus of the business activity and its distribution. No 
consensus has been reached on the way the surplus should be distributed or whether 
it should be an objective of the co-operative. However, certain shared rules deal with 
distribution. It is common for one part of this surplus to return to the partner, while 
the rest remains in the co-operative and must be used to increase retained earnings 
and provide funds for training and inter-cooperation activities.  
In short, maximization of individual economic objectives (net income, wages, 
employment, etc.) must be present in the analysis of these democratic firms, but it 
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must also consider the impact of property rights on future partner income. We 
propose that these elements be taken as restrictions to the collective objectives 
pursued by co-operatives. 
3. Objectives and Principles 
The co-op must make compatible collective and individual aims, and it must do so 
respecting co-operative principles. This puts these firms in a special place with 
respect to the rest of the capitalist companies (Marcuello and Nachar 2013), 
particularly when they need to increase financial resources. New equity may come 
from either current or new partners. In the case of the former, the members keep 
control of the company but make a greater financial effort. In the case of the latter, 
the current partners may reduce their financial contribution in exchange of decision-
making power.  
Although both alternatives may be combined to achieve the same collective 
objective, our model proposes a situation in which partners must choose between 
two extreme situations: to either open the door to a greater number of partners and 
reduce their individual financial contribution or make a greater contribution to 
capital to avoid the entry of new partners. 
3.1. The Co-operative’s perspective 
Collectively, a co-operative must try to obtain the maximum level of production from 
the resources provided by partners. Let n be the number of co-operative members 
who decide to jointly exploit an asset, A. The participation of partners in the business 
activity will depend on the type of co-operative. This may consist in a number of 
work hours, delivered production, or acquired production. Regardless of the type of 
participation, let us call the partner's net contribution to the activity xi. 
Given that the participation of each partner is generally very much alike, we will 
assume that it is the same for all the n partners: 
 
     (1) 
 
Then, let X be the function describing the aggregate net product of the activity 
the partners can obtain with the available asset (which we will consider constant).  
 
        (2) 
 
The partners must therefore decide on the number of partners participating in the 
co-operative. They must also decide the working hours or amount of product to be 
delivered or consumed. This function must comply with a series of requirements so 
that members decide to share the asset. In the first place, the product of the business 
activity must increase with the number of partners, regardless of the legal form of 
the company: 
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         (3) 
 
Secondly, we have assumed that the income derived from the entry of new 
members is distributed per capita among all the partners; a partner will show greater 
willingness to receive new members when the production function presents 
increasing returns4. That is: 
 
         (4)                                       
 
The fulfillment of this condition implies that the entry of new partners increases 
net product per partner given that the member’s marginal net product is higher than 
the marginal increase of the average net product. 
 
         (5) 
 
Given the double condition of the partner, he will choose to join a co-operative 
as long as his net production exceeds what he would obtain individually. Using this 
same criterion, the members of an existing co-operative are willing to welcome new 
partners if the increase in the net production of the co-operative after the entry is 
accompanied by an increase in the average net product per partner. 
We must now assume that increasing returns of the co-operation disappear as of 
a certain number  of partners. Otherwise, it would always compensate to exploit 
the common asset. Thus, the production function must present diminishing returns. 
In this case, the properties of the function are: 
 
          (6) 
         (7) 
 
The entry of a new partner makes the increase in the marginal net production per 
partner lower than the marginal increase in the average net production. This 
discourages the entry of new partners. 
Since  is the value as of which increasing returns become decreasing returns, 
the following must be fulfilled: 
 




4  Diminishing returns discourage new membership. It compensates to hire new workers that receive a salary 
equivalent to marginal productivity, as presented in the WDV model. 
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From all of the above, we have obtained the characteristics the co-operative’s 
production function must present to explain restrictions on the entry of new members 
and why some co-operatives share a common asset. 
       (9) 
 
Values below create incentives to cooperate, which disappear as of higher 
values.  This explains why numerous co-operatives have a small number of partners. 
However, it is unable to explain the existence of co-operatives with a number of 
partners greater than . To this end, we propose to include the principle of economic 
participation in the analysis. 
3.2. Income Distribution: Principle of Economic Participation 
In the co-operative, members' income for their contributions to capital (ki) and 
participation in productive activity ( ) must be established in advance to apply the 
value of commutative justice. Being  the fixed price for the fair remuneration of the 
capital,  constitutes the financial compensation. Let us call the price that the 
co-operative establishes as fair remuneration for the participation of each partner in 
the activity, in such a way that  is the economic compensation of the member.  
is the sum of the financial and economic compensation of all the partners: 
 
                    (10) 
 
The co-operative assumes the collective objective of achieving at least enough 
income to compensate all of its members both financially and economically. 
Assuming that all partners receive the same income ( ) and contribute an equal 
amount to the capital (k)5. That is to say: 
 
                   (11) 
 
                  (12) 
 
By considering [11] and [12], expression [10] above may be rewritten as: 
 
                               (13) 
Given our assumptions, we can see that  fluctuates according to the number of 
partners, but it is constant for the other variables. Increased partnership permits co-
_____________ 
 
5  The total amount contributed by the members is not necessarily equal to the total asset. The coop may also 
finance their assets with the retained earnings, which do not individually belong to partners. 
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ops to increase their production. However, this implies a greater salary expense; the 
marginal increase of production must at least meet the value of the salary: 
                   (14) 
If we establish p as the market price of product X offered by the co-operative in 
a competitive market, the fulfillment of the objectives will depend on the volume of 
net income (pX) achieved by the co-operative. Three different situations may take 
place: 
i. Case : The net income of the co-operative is insufficient to achieve the 
fair remuneration of the members; the company has losses. Given this 
situation, one of the possible strategies is to reduce the number of partners. 
ii. Case : If this happens, the co-op compensates their members 
financially and economically according to the established remuneration. The 
criterion of commutative justice is fulfilled, but distributive justice cannot be 
applied because there is no surplus. This situation creates no incentives to 
increase size. 
iii. Case : If the company obtains a positive surplus ( ) in 
addition to satisfying the economic needs of the partners, it may fully apply 
the principle of economic participation. The part of the surplus retained as 
common equity enables the co-op to pursue the collective objective. This 
situation creates incentives to open the door to new members and increase 
size. 
 
The latter case explains the existence of co-operatives with a number of partners 
above the critical value ( ). Taken to the extreme, this fact could lead to an 
unlimited growth of the co-operative. Evidently, it is unlikely to happen because 
decision-making cost rises as membership increases. So, the model requires a 
variable that reflects cost variation upon new membership.   
3.3. Decision Costs: Principle of Democratic Management 
The value of democracy, initially collected in one member one vote is the hallmark 
of co-operative firm. In the models of classical literature, this effect is implicit in the 
production function upon the existence of diminishing returns. The literature 
generally concurs that a greater number of partners always generates a higher cost 
because the heterogeneity of the partners increases and it becomes increasingly 
difficult to reach a consensus (Hansmann, 1988; Hart and Moore, 1998). Given the 
likely significant effect of new membership on decision-making, it seems relevant 
to explain this effect and the technical function of net production  separately6. 
Similarly, if we define:  
                     (15) 
as the function describing how the costs of applying the democratic management 
principle evolve as the number of partners increases, then: 
_____________ 
 
6  In other words, X now includes technology that is available to all firms, regardless of their organizational form. 
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                   (16) 
                   (17) 
The growth of these costs may vary from one co-operative to another. In small 
teams, the decision is usually made by consensus and in real time, needless of prior 
meetings. This speeds up the decision-making process practically without incurring 
costs. We may say this represents a system of direct democracy in decision-making. 
The cost of reaching an agreement increases as the number of members increases. 
What is more, they are expected to increase in a greater proportion as of a certain 
number of partners. This makes it impossible to apply the system of direct 
democracy, which will instead be closer to a representative democracy. In the latter 
case, growth in decision costs stabilizes upon the delegation of most of the decision-
making. 
The union of the net production function of the co-operative and the function of 
decision costs allows us to express the objective function of the co-operative as: 
 
                 (18) 
 
When combining these costs with the net production function, the defined 
characteristics of the net income function are: 
i. It is canceled for a value of n equal to zero or when X(n)=D(n). In this case, 
the positive effects of carrying out joint business activity in the co-operative 
are offset by the decision costs derived from participating in the 
management. The costs of democratic management absorb the results of 
economic participation. 
ii. It takes positive values whenever X(n)>D(n), i.e., with a number of partners 
for whom the net income exceeds the decision cost. 
iii. It is increasing when  because . The increase in income 
derived from the entry of new partners is greater than the increase in the 
decision costs that such entry causes. 
iv. It is decreasing when  given that . The increase in income 
derived from the entry of new partners is less than the increase in decision 
costs caused by the entry. 
This function is no more than the net income function of the WDV model, which 
explicitly incorporates the costs derived from the application of the democratic 
management principle. 
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3.4. Strategies and Dilemmas of the Co-operative 
For the sake of clarity, let us propose that the net production of co-op, Y, adopts the 
functional form described in [19]. As we will see, this function complies with the 
previous theoretical requirements.  
 
                 (19) 
 
In this equation the ratio  informs of the use each partner makes, on 
average, of the shared asset. This can be interpreted as the productivity of the partner. 
Thus, the function shows that the production of the co-operative depends on the 
number of partners, the volume of assets and the average productivity of the member.  
Parameters α and β reflect the organizational capacity of the co-operative to 
extract from the group of partners a volume of net production higher than what they 
would extract if these partners worked separately. The first term (α qn2) is 
associated with the positive effects of the entry of new partners on production, while 
the second term (β q2n3) corresponds to the negative effects of a greater number of 
partners. This second term may also be interpreted as a congestion effect resulting 
from a greater number of partners jointly managing the asset. 
It can be seen in the function that the product  is the asset turnover. 
Assuming that the asset volume is fixed, we may observe that asset turnover becomes 
the main variable, in function of the number of partners. As a consequence, asset 
turnover increases only and only if new members enter. The level of assets, which 
we have assumed to be constant, determines the scale of the activity7. 
We can analytically verify that the proposed function complies with the general 
properties discussed above. A maximum of production is present for a certain 
number of partners when the following two conditions are met: 
 
                  (20) 
                 (21) 
 
The function Y shows positive values provided that α>βqn. Under this condition, 
it is satisfied that the net production reaches a turning point in n=α/3βq and a 




. As of this last value, the entry of more partners would have more negative 
than positive effects. 
If we establish the price level as the unit, variable Y represents the accounting net 
turnover (which approaches the concept of net co-operative income proposed in the 
_____________ 
 
7  If the partner decides to work independently, income function would contain neither the positive nor the negative 
impact of the cooperation. The term  would be one and β woud be zero. Then, incomes for not cooperating 
would simply arise from individual productivity and capital contribution ki. The result is a Leontief production 
function and the economy presents constant returns to scale. Any firm may enter the market by replicating the 
same technology. The final supply will depend on the market prices. 
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WDV model). We can affirm that the co-operative function will have positive 
income and a maximum in 𝑛 =
2𝛼
3β𝑞
 provided that: 
 
                  (22) 
 
Under our assumptions, the entry of more partners will depend on the 
organizational capacity of the co-operative for a given asset turnover. The greater 
the difference between the positive effects of cooperating (α) and the negative effects 
of cooperating (β), the greater the number of partners reaching maximum revenue is. 
The defined production function also allows us to deduce that, for a given α and a β, 
the partner will prefer to share the common asset the lower the productivity it extracts 
from the asset separately. In other words, cooperation allows for a more intensive 
use of shared resources, which would otherwise maintain a certain degree of 
idleness. This is really the condition of viability of the co-operative.  
This objective must be achieved under the principle of economic participation. 
As we may recall, this is: 
 
                  (23) 
 
This function takes the value  for n=0 and increases with respect to n. Its slope 
is the salary established in the co-operative . Figure 1 displays the line 
relative to the net production function. More than one strategy accomplishes the 
objectives of the co-operative. 
Figure. 1. The co-op objective. 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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For a number of partners between the values nL and nK, the co-operative may meet 
its objectives8. For values lower than the first or higher than the second, the co-
operative fails to satisfy the restriction. It is precisely in the values nL and nK that the 
equality between the net income of the co-operative and fair remuneration of the 
partner is met. This situation reveals a first dilemma faced by the members of the co-
operative: it can achieve the same goal with a small or large number of partners. 
Evidently, the same principle of open membership is being applied differently in nL 
and nK. 
A relevant difference affects the way the principle of economic participation is 
applied between the intermediate values and the values nL and nK. The accounting 
surplus is zero at the extremes, while the co-operative liquidates its accounts with a 
positive surplus in the intermediate values. This is the second dilemma faced by the 
members. If they only intend to apply distributive justice and achieve a fair 
retribution of activity and capital, the co-operative must choose between two 
alternatives: nL or nK. However, the number of members is between the values nL and 
nK if they also apply the value of commutative justice. This is where the net income 
of the co-operative exceeds the income assigned to the members and, consequently, 
the surplus is positive.  
In cases of positive surplus, the principle of economic participation establishes 
that the surplus must be partially used to increase the resources of the co-operative, 
as well as coop training, information and collaboration9. The model shows diverse 
possibilities of surplus. Its maximum level, 𝑛𝑆
𝑚𝑎𝑥
, is not necessarily reached with 
the largest number of partners or the largest volume of co-operative net income. The 
number of partners with which to obtain the maximum surplus may be lower than 
the maximum net income. Its amount depends on the technical characteristics of the 
company, but it essentially depends on whether the collective objective of the co-
operative includes the surplus. Although these objectives are decided democratically 
among all partners, each partner must finally make a personal assessment on how 
new membership affects their individual objectives.10 
3.5. The Partner's Perspective 
The perspective of the partner is not necessarily identical to the perspective of the 
co-operative. Each partner must analyze how he is particularly affected by the entry 
of a new member. Part of the effects will take place immediately as a result of their 
economic participation, while other effects will extend into the future as a result of 
the cost associated to the financial immobilization of their contribution to the capital. 
_____________ 
 
8  The point nL may or may not be equal to the turning point. This will depend on each co-op’s decision concerning 
fair income. 
9  Law establishes a minimum mandatory reinvesment percentage over economic surplus (30 per cent), while the 
remainder may be used to compensate partners for their participation in the activity, regardless of their financial 
contribution. 
10  This is the discussion between the English and French schools in the 19th century. According to the former, 
worker cooperatives were entitled to obtain surplus. However, the French school believed worker cooperatives 
had to be subordinated to consumer cooperatives and surplus appropriated by the consumer through reduced 
prices. 
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The net production per member results from dividing the joint production by the 
number of partners: 
 
                 (24) 
 
The function is growing and concave with respect to the number of partners, 
as may be deduced from the first and second derivatives of the function: 
 
                           (25) 
                  (26) 
 




It is canceled for the values n = 0 and 𝑛 =
𝛼
𝛽𝑞
. For low values of n, the entry of new 
partners leads to an increase in the net income of the co-operative, until it reaches its 
maximum value at α/2βq. From this value, costs grow at a faster rate than the 
revenues generated by the greater number of partners. Consequently, even though 
the number of members may increase beyond the value for which the 
 maximum income is reached, this increase is associated with a reduction in the 
net income of the co-operative. 
Figure. 2. The partner’s objective. 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
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The partner does not receive , but rather receives , the income that results 
from applying the co-operative principle of economic participation: 
 
                  (27) 
 
As we have assumed that all members have contributed equal parts of capital, the 
individual income of the member is: 
 
                  (28) 
 
This function monotonically decreases with horizontal asymptote in , given 
that: 
 
                   (29) 
                   (30) 
In Figure 2 we can see how the net income and the fair income per member both 
change with the number of members when the asset is kept constant. Clearly from 
the sign of the expression [29], the individual contributions to capital are reduced 
with the entry of partners and so is the remuneration for this concept. Thus, the 
remuneration perceived in the limit (expression [30]) is close to the one 
corresponding to an employee of the co-operative that contributes no capital (only 
labor). The entry of new partners allows for a constant economic income, and it 
reduces individual financial income due to the lower capital contribution. For the 
values of nL and nK, the compensation of the partner coincides with the average net 
product per member, for which there is no surplus. The surplus is positive between 
the intermediate values. 
Therefore, when a co-operative considers the optimal size of membership to share 
an asset, each partner must choose the appropriate combination of economic 
participation and financial participation at an individual level, and consider the 
impact of new membership on the decision-making process. The smaller the number 
of partners, the lower the decision costs in exchange for making a greater individual 
contribution in terms of capital. The greater the willingness to enter new partners, 
the higher the decision costs that will be compensated with a lower financial 
commitment. Both decisions are strategies that result from applying co-operative 
principles differently. 
When members choose to keep a small number of members, they restrict the open 
door principle by setting a high requirement in terms of capital contribution per 
member. In so doing, they also concentrate income from the activity and reduce the 
differences between the marginal revenue per partner and the average net income per 
partner. This is the situation that is exposed in the WDV models. At the other 
extreme, the partners flexibly apply the principle of open membership to reduce 
capital requirements per member. However, they run the risk of distorting the 
Cabaleiro Casal, M.J., Iglesias Malvido, C. y Martínez Fontaíña, R. Revesco (132) 2019: 29-45 43 
 
 
essence of the co-operative with extremely low financial contributions per partner. 
Each partner acts like a salaried worker. 
These are the two situations usually highlighted in the co-operative: one describes 
the difficulties of co-operatives to grow, and the other their tendency to behave like 
a conventional capitalist firm. However, a third situation happens when the partners 
voluntarily waive part of their income and maintain a positive surplus as their usual 
policy. This is the way co-ops achieve economic success and it includes: obtaining 
economic compensation for the partners, reinvesting in the co-op and making the 
democratic firm extensive to new members and to society as a whole. 
4. Conclusions 
The economic success of the co-operative depends on the way the partners apply the 
principles, particularly when they decide on their strategy to admit new partners. 
Some of these strategies allow the survival of the co-operative, but clearly differ in 
size and financial commitment. Most are demanding in terms of new membership 
given the increase in decision costs associated to applying the democratic 
management principle. This makes them small-sized firms with reduced membership 
that maintain high participation in the activity and high financial contribution. Yet 
we observe that other companies open the door to a greater number of partners 
because this has no significant effect on decision costs and it entails lower individual 
partner commitment in the firm’s activity and financing. Although they implement 
the principle of free access differently, both strategies apply the principle of 
economic participation the same way; this leads to the non-existence of surplus. This 
might imply the risk of degeneration but, above all, it breaches the ultimate objective: 
the expansion of the co-operative formula. 
Contrarily, when partners apply the value of commutative economic justice 
implicit in the principle of economic participation in addition to complying with the 
principles of open membership and democratic management, they contribute to the 
expansion of the co-operative model in conditions that guarantee the economic 
viability of the firm. If the increase in income is greater than the increase in the costs 
of the activity, both in terms of production and decisions, the resulting net income 
leads to a positive surplus. According to the value of distributive justice inherent in 
the principle of economic participation, this surplus must return to the individual, the 
co-operative and society. That is, democracy contributes to the economic success of 
the co-operatives when the partners integrate the full set of principles into their 
individual and collective objectives. 
This paper highlights that one of the keys to economic success lies in following 
the principles outlined by co-operative movement forerunners. These principles have 
hardly changed throughout time. They are the fundamental core of co-ops and the 
best blueprints for harmonizing individual and collective objectives. This is why our 
work suggests keeping this perspective in the analysis and leaving behind the 
recurrent comparison between co-ops and other economic organizations. To this end, 
we should make a greater effort to analyze the principle of economic participation to 
better understand the impact of a positive net surplus on the viability of the co-
operative movement. 
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